"By dissolving the contradictions internal to hypotheses I and II in these ways, the hearer has already done the groundwork for the dissolution of the contradiction between I and II. That the One both has "all [characters]" (II) and lacks even being and unity (I) is contradictory just insofar as "the One" refers to the selfsame subject. Yet the preceding reflections make this questionable. In I, on the one-hand, the real point of the denials is to set the One beyond the order of spatio-temporal existence; if it "is" at all, the One has the timeless being of the forms. In II, on the other hand, Parmenides shows how the One is subject to the categories, the basic kinds of character, proper to spatio-temporal existence. Thus the two hypotheses appear to examine two distinct sorts of unit. Ones that belong to essentially different orders of being."
Plato’s Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul / Mitchell H. Miller Jr. (1986 / 1991, p 96)
One would want to read a Miller on Heidegger. Mathematical precision makes love to literary sensitivity. Like Plato, he is a great teacher.
"First of all, the sheer intellectual exasperation they generate puts the hearer to a test. Precisely because they help to deny the familiar reference to particulars (…) they bring the hearer to a moment of decision: in the face of his own impatience, he must choose whether to suffer the loss of reference for the sake of his philosophical development or to give up philosophy and, in particular, the study of the hypotheses in order to recover his familiar context."
Plato’s Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul / Mitchell H. Miller Jr. (1986 / 1991, p 75)